To say that this assignment is a tough one for me is an
understatement. Being that I work for
the US Navy whose rigid hierarchal structure is about as firmly planted as it
can be, it tough to even envision a branch of the armed services using a
flatter organizational structure none-the-less a Complex Adaptive System
(CAS). Further, I’m not sure the
military has the need to even switch to one.
While organizations in the public sector have problems with
communication up and down the chain of command, the military has almost
perfected this process. The rigid
structure makes it perfectly clear where the information needs to go and
when. This is incredibly important to
know as any hesitation in communication flow can literally kill someone. With that being said, hierarchal structures
are often paralyzed with bureaucracy and the military is definitely a slave to
it also. Perhaps that is why our
government is slipping more and more towards what Obolensky says will happen to
all silo based structures, it will face death (Obolensky 2010).
Looking into all of the organizations that are listed in the
book that feature CAS, they all have one thing in common (other than the fact
that they are a CAS system) is that their employees are all heavily involved
with all aspects of the organization at all levels. Clearly this will work in the business world
as some companies are already making waves in the market using CAS for their
organizational structure, however I am not sure it would work in an organization
where people are not as heavily invested in the organization like the
military. No matter how hard you work,
your pay will be identical to every other O3 (or whatever rank) in the service. Sure you might get an Early Promote on your
FITREP, but all that means is that you are slightly more selectable to move to
the next rank once you have spent the mandatory time required in that
rank. Within the government, there is
little benefit to working harder for the organization except for pride whereas
in the business sector (and especially with CAS structures), every employee has
a vested interest in how the company performs and thus is willing to go the
extra mile because they can see more clearly that it affects them directly
(notice how I said they can see this effect – every employee makes a mark on an
organization regardless of where they are at in the system, however if you don’t
give them a reason to take note of that fact, a decent number will not).
So where does the Navy go from here? I think in some respects it could move
towards a matrix type organization, especially since in some respects it
already is. For example, in the other
services, each portion of the organizational structure above the company level
has its own support staff. As you move,
each command over that also has a staff and so on up to the top of the
structure. This is very similar to a
matrix organization since each individual matrix in the organization has its
own support functions (Obolensky 2010).
Additionally, reporting and processes are efficient and centralized in
HQ cells (up all the way to DC) (Obolensky 2010). Here, however, the similarities stop. There is nothing slimmed down about the upper
echelons of any branch in the service.
For example, the Navy today has roughly 334 flag officers of various
ranks or flag selects ("Navy.mil leadership biographies" )
So, in summary, I think that reducing some of the bureaucracy
at the higher levels of the organization would be a step in the right
direction. With that being said, I just
don’t see how the DoD could operate away from a silo type organization except
for the small transitions that have occurred already. Being that I have yet to interview the ADM
Greenhart, Chief of Naval Operations or VADM Morgan, N3/N5, I do not have any
insight into what their plans are for the future organizational structure of
the Navy, however moving to a CAS type structure is probably not one of
them. I would be interested in
investigating if there have been any military units that have experimented with
this type of structure however. Perhaps
part of my problem with this blog is that I am just too indoctrinated into the
organization and am applying ample amounts of group think. While I’d like to think this isn’t the case,
like I said, I’d love for someone to prove me otherwise.
Obolensky,
N. (2012). Complex adaptive leadership, embracing paradox and uncertainty.
Gower Publishing Company.
Navy.mil
leadership biographies. (n.d.). Retrieved from
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/bios/bio_list.asp
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